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Abstract
Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at
a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-a-vis taxpayers. We report the
first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property
tax units in Punjab, Pakistan into one of three performance-pay schemes or a control. After
two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates
to a 46 percent higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best,
increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64 percent higher growth rate), with little penalty for
customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly
also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties
becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at
previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead
report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance
pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who either have to pay higher bribes
to avoid being reassessed, or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.
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offices for their support over the many years of this project. Financial support for the evaluation came from 3ie,
the IGC, and the NSF (under grant SES-1124134), and financial support for the incentive payments described here
came from the Government of the Punjab, Pakistan. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the many individuals or organizations acknowledged here.
1 Introduction
Tax systems in developing countries collect substantially less revenue as a share of GDP than
their counterparts in developed countries (Gordon and Li 2009, Kleven et al. 2014). While there
are many differences, an important one is the role played by the tax officials in assessing, enforcing,
and auditing taxes. Combined with relatively low wages and limited performance rewards, the
temptations for tax inspectors to collude with taxpayers to reduce tax receipts are great.
One possible solution is to tie the compensation of tax staff to the revenue they generate. This
is an old idea: historically, states from the Roman Empire through the French Monarchy (Bartlett
1994, White 2004) sold the rights to collect taxes to “tax farmers,” who then kept a fraction (or
in some cases all) of the tax revenue they collected. US states similarly experimented with highly
incentivized “tax ferrets” to collect property taxes in the 19th century. Though tax officials in these
historical regimes were unpopular, and the world has largely moved to salaried tax officials (Parrillo
2013), countries such as Brazil, Peru, Pakistan, and others have begun to reconsider incentives for
tax staff (Das-Gupta and Mookherjee 1998, Kahn et al. 2001) as a way to improve tax compliance.
The challenge, however, is that by strengthening the bargaining ability of tax collectors, perfor-
mance incentives may not only lead to taxpayer dissatisfaction, but may also alter the division of
rents from collusion without necessarily increasing revenue raised by the government. To see this,
consider a simple bargaining setting in which a tax collector colludes with a taxpayer to reduce
the tax assessment in exchange for a bribe. If there is no cost to either party from reducing tax
liability, then performance pay for tax collectors will simply raise the bribe paid with no impact on
revenue, as the taxpayer now has to compensate the collector’s foregone incentive payment with a
higher bribe. In more realistic settings, where there is some cost to either party from reduced tax
liabilities, there will be two different effects: some taxpayers will continue in the collusive, low tax
equilibrium but pay higher bribes, while others will end up paying higher taxes and lower bribes
as they switch from the collusive, low tax equilibrium to a non-collusive, higher tax equilibrium.
Performance pay could thus have heterogeneous effects on tax revenue and bribes among taxpayers.
Whether performance pay actually leads to increased revenue – and at what cost in terms of higher
bribes and potentially foregone taxpayer satisfaction – is therefore ultimately an empirical question.
In this paper, we provide what is to the best of our knowledge the first experimental evidence on
these questions. Working with the Punjab, Pakistan provincial government, we randomly allocated
tax officials in the entire provincial urban property tax department, which consists of 482 property
tax units (known as circles), into one of three versions of performance-based pay schemes or a control
group. A total of 218 circles, consisting of about 550 tax personnel, were randomly allocated to
one of the three treatment groups, for two fiscal years. The incentives were large: the three-person
tax team in each treated circle was collectively given an average of 30 percent of all tax revenues it
collected above a historically-predicted benchmark. Many personnel in treated areas were able to
double their baseline salaries or more through these incentives.
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Given concerns about potential negative impacts of high-powered incentives, the three schemes
varied in both the extent to which they based performance pay explicitly on taxpayer satisfaction
and accuracy of assessment in addition to revenue, and the extent to which they allowed for sub-
jective evaluation on the part of the tax department. The “Revenue” scheme provided incentives
based solely on revenue collected above a benchmark predicted from historical data. To address
multi-tasking concerns and in an effort to incentivize accurate assessment (and hence also tackle
collusion) (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), the “Revenue Plus” scheme provided incentives exactly
as in the Revenue scheme, but made adjustments (plus/minus three-fourths of baseline salary)
based on whether the circle ranked in the top, middle, or bottom third of circles in terms of tax-
payer satisfaction and accuracy of tax assessments, as determined by an independent survey of
taxpayers. To allow for more subjective assessments rather than purely formulaic criteria (Baker
et al. 1994, MacLeod 2003), the third scheme, “Flexible Bonus,” took this a step further by both
rewarding collectors for a much wider set of pre-specified criteria set by the tax department, and
by allowing for subjective adjustments based on period-end overall performance.
We evaluate the impact of the schemes using multiple sources of data. For tax revenues, we
obtained administrative data, which we verified by conducting random spot-checks against the tax
department’s bank records. For outcomes such as perceived corruption and satisfaction with the tax
department, we conducted a survey of over 16,000 taxpayers and their properties throughout the
province. For estimating assessment accuracy, the surveyors also directly observed and recorded
the property characteristics used in the tax calculation. We then manually matched surveyed
properties to the tax rolls to obtain the corresponding tax records for each property. Tax assessment
is determined formulaically from these property characteristics, so this allowed us to determine the
accuracy of assessments by comparing our survey measurements to those on the official tax rolls.
We find that, on average across the three schemes, by the end of the two years performance
pay led to an increase in tax revenue of about 9.4 log points based on the administrative data.
This translates to a 46 percent higher growth rate in revenues compared to control areas. We show
that this came predominantly through an increase in the reported tax base (i.e. the total assessed
value of properties) rather than through increased recovery or changes in exemptions granted. On
average, we find little impact of the schemes on taxpayer satisfaction. Specifically, the increased
revenue generated as a result of the schemes is not accompanied by a decline in the typical taxpayers’
perceptions of the quality of service from the tax office or in their satisfaction with their dealings
with the tax office. We also find no overall change in the accuracy of tax assessments. Thus, on
average, we find that the incentives increase revenue with little obvious downside in terms of overall
perception of the tax department in the eyes of the typical taxpayer.
Comparing the three schemes, we find that they differ substantially in terms of their impact
on revenue, with relatively small differences on taxpayer satisfaction and perception of the tax
department. Specifically, the Revenue scheme, which provided incentives purely based on revenue
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collected, showed 15.2 log points higher current-year revenues relative to controls (57 percent higher
growth rate) by the second year. In comparison, the Revenue Plus scheme achieved only 8.1 log
points, and the Flexible Bonus scheme only a statistically insignificant 3.5 log point increase in
current-year revenue. While the Revenue Plus scheme did improve perceived customer satisfaction
and quality perceptions relative to to the Revenue and Flexible Bonus schemes, the differences were
small, and the substantially lower revenue collected meant that this scheme had a substantially lower
rate of return. The Flexible Bonus scheme did not do better on any dimension we can measure in
our data, and in fact did worse compared to the control group on perception of the department’s
quality. Thus, adding multiple dimensions to performance pay substantially diluted the impact on
revenue without a substantial corresponding increase in non-monetary outcomes.
Our survey data suggests that there was, indeed, a reallocation of rents associated with perfor-
mance incentives, and finds evidence of precisely the sort of heterogeneity suggested by a simple
theory of collusion. For most properties in performance pay tax circles, taxpayers were not re-
assessed and reported no change in tax paid. However, relative to the control group, they reported
a Rs. 594 (about US $6) increase in the going rate for a bribe paid to property tax officers for
properties similar to theirs, which represents a roughly 32% increase. While this does not neces-
sarily imply that every household paid these higher bribes, respondents also indicated that bribe
payments were more frequent.
However, for the small number of properties whose tax valuation was formally changed (either
newly assessed or reassessed), these taxpayers report paying substantially higher taxes, but do
not report the higher bribes that other properties in performance pay circles reported. Moreover,
while comparisons between our survey data and corresponding administrative records suggest that
typical properties are under-taxed, this does not hold for these reassessed properties, which appear
on average to be taxed accurately. There is also an increase in the number of these newly assessed
or reassessed properties in performance pay circles. These results are consistent with what one
might expect given collusion: performance pay means that inspectors can demand higher bribes to
compensate them for their forgone (performance) pay, but, given the higher bribe now required to
maintain collusion, some may instead switch from collusion (low tax, high bribe) to non-collusion
(high tax, low bribe).
These results suggest that the increase in tax collected under the performance pay schemes is
driven by a relatively small number of properties that are (correctly) reassessed and switch from
collusion to non-collusion, paying much higher taxes and lower bribes. It is interesting to examine
what determines who ends up in this group. In general, we find that these newly reassessed
properties have taxable value that is about 67 percent higher than the typical (non-reassessed)
property. In treatment areas, the reassessed properties are even more valuable than reassessed
properties elsewhere, by another 33 percent. Reassessed properties in general are also more likely
to be commercial properties, which are taxed at a higher rate. There is also some suggestive
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evidence that, while property owners with political connections avoid being reassessed in control
areas, they lose this degree of protection in treatment areas. On net, the results suggest that tax
inspectors focus on a small number of high-value properties to increase revenue, thus potentially
raising revenue while minimizing political costs.
From the government’s perspective, the relative desirability of the schemes depends on the
government’s objective function. For a politician who seeks to maximize tax revenues subject to
political constraints, the evidence presented here suggests that the Revenue scheme is the most
effective: it raised the current-year revenue by 15.2 log points (57 percent higher growth rate),
which implies a substantially positive return-on-investment (35-51%), and it did not appreciably
reduce satisfaction with the tax department compared to controls. While the Revenue Plus scheme
did slightly better on satisfaction than the Revenue scheme, it generated a lower (14-28%) return
on investment.
This paper builds on several different literatures. First, while there is a substantial tradition of
theoretical work on performance pay and compensation for tax officials in the developing world (see,
for example, Besley and McLaren 1993, Mookherjee and Png 1995), there is very little empirical
evidence on how these types of incentives work in practice.1 Indeed, while there is a small-but-
growing and exciting empirical literature on tax and development, it has focused to date primarily
on how taxpayers respond to different types of enforcement (e.g., Gordon and Li 2009, Pomeranz
2013, Kumler et al. 2013, Carillo et al. 2014) and various aspects of the tax code (Kleven and
Waseem 2013, Best et al. 2013), rather than on the role of, or how to improve performance of, tax
staff. Second, this paper is related to several recent papers on improving developing country civil
service performance in other contexts and using other tools. Existing work has focused on the role
of wages (Dal Bó et al. 2013), intrinsic motivation (Ashraf et al. 2013), and management (Rasul
and Rogger 2013). The recent work on performance pay has been centered on education and health
sectors (Glewwe et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Gertler and Vermeersch 2013),
where collusive forces are not as salient. Finally, this paper builds on the growing literature on
corruption (see Olken and Pande 2012 for a review). For example, a recent paper by Duflo et al.
(2013) shows that changing the incentives for third-party auditors to make them more independent
increases honesty in their reporting; this paper finds similar benefits but also highlights that such
incentives have the countervailing potential to increase bribes if collusion continues. More generally,
it underscores that when there is corruption, output-based incentives for government officials can
have very different effects depending on how they affect the downstream bargaining between officials
and citizens.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant features
of the property tax administration in Punjab, the setting in which the study takes place. Section
1To the best of our knowledge, the best empirical evidence on the impact of performance pay on tax collection
is a time-series study of a performance pay reform in Brazil (Kahn et al. 2001), which is not able to examine any
non-revenue outcomes such as bribery or taxpayer satisfaction.
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3 outlines theoretically what impact one might expect from performance pay in a setting with
collusion between tax inspectors and taxpayers. Section 4 outlines the experimental design, Section
5 describes the data and empirical approach, and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
All appendix material is available in the online appendix.
2 Setting
2.1 Property Taxes in Urban Punjab
Punjab is Pakistan’s most populous province: its population of over 80 million would rank
fifteenth in the world were it a country. Property tax collection in Punjab is roughly a fifth of the
level of comparable countries (World Bank 2006) due to a wide variety of problems: not only is the
tax base narrow and tax rates low, but also tax evasion and corruption are widespread, distrust
in public institutions runs high, and administration is weak (World Bank 2006, Bahl et al. 2008,
World Bank 2009).
The urban property tax in Punjab is levied on the Gross Annual Rental Value (GARV) of the
property, which is computed by formula. The GARV is determined by measuring the square footage
of land and buildings on the property, and then multiplying by standardized values from a table.
These valuation tables divide the province into seven categories (A to G) according to the extent
of facilities and infrastructure in the area, with different rates for each category. Rates further vary
by residential, commercial or industrial status, whether the property is owner-occupied or rented,
and location (i.e. on or off a main road). Taxes are paid into designated bank branches (through
the National Bank of Pakistan). A copy of the receipt of payment is given to the taxpayer at the
time of payment, and the bank also provides a copy to the tax collector and a copy to the provincial
Treasury.
Several distortions place constraints on tax collection and introduce substantial scope for cor-
ruption. These distortions include substantially different rates for residential and commercial prop-
erties (which can be easily reclassified), as well as granting exemptions to widows, the disabled,
owners of plots below 5 marlas (about 125 square meters), retired federal and provincial govern-
ment employees, and religious charitable institutions (World Bank 2006). The two most notable
distortions are between owner-occupied and rented residential properties (the latter are taxed ten
times more) and between residential and commercial properties (the latter are taxed between 3 and
6 times more). Qualitative evidence suggests that these distortions are the main ways in which tax
evasion takes place, both due to the significant impact these margins have on tax assessment and
also because it is less easy to verify whether a residential property is being rented or, particularly
for mixed usage properties, what fraction of the property is being used for commercial purposes.
For research purposes, a methodological advantage of property taxes is that, unlike most taxes,
true property tax liability can be independently estimated by the researcher. By comparing official
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tax payments to an independent assessment by an external survey team, we can determine changes
to both the accuracy of tax evasion and the average level of over or under taxation. This approach
follows other examples in the corruption literature (e.g., Fisman and Wei 2004, Olken 2007).
2.2 Property tax administration
The primary unit of tax collection is the “circle,” a predefined geographical area that covers
anywhere from two to ten thousand unique properties. Within each circle there is a team of three
tax officers: an “inspector” who leads the team, determines tax assessments and issues notices that
demand payment; a “clerk” in charge of record keeping; and a “constable” who assists the inspector
in the field. Together they maintain a record of all properties and their attributes (size, type of
use, etc.), apply the valuation tables to each property, and determine which exemptions apply.
The inspector determines each property’s tax liability and sends an annual tax bill to the property
owner.
All three officials are part of the provincial career bureaucracy, with wages determined by salary
band and length of service. As is common for civil servants in developing economies, tax officials
receive fairly low wages that are rarely, if ever, tied to performance. However, since the department
has explicit financial targets each year, there is pressure on each circle team to contribute. This
occurs typically through each administrative level pressuring lower levels to increase collections.
With limited reward mechanisms or vertical mobility, threats of transfers are the primarily tool
available to supervisors who want to improve performance. While some inspectors do have strong
preferences over their posted circle, these threats have limited effectiveness since transfers are often
more politically based than merit based (Piracha and Moore 2015).
The tax administration system leaves considerable opportunities for leakages, collusion, and
low collection, especially because there are few independent checks on the actions of the tax circle
team and limited audit mechanisms. For example, the property database is manually recorded on
physical registers and does not automatically include new properties or property updates. Building
permits and rental agreements are not always formally registered, and when they are registered
they are not automatically linked to tax rolls, so the tax department learns about new construction
or changes in property use only through the efforts of the circle staff. In addition, officials may
employ significant discretion in applying valuation tables to individual properties and determining
exemptions. For example, properties can be incorrectly designated as owner-occupied when they
are being rented out (and as noted above, the latter are taxed at a ten times higher rate), classified
as residential when they are in fact commercial, designated as “off road” when they are on a main
road, or mis-measured. Finally, the manual system of billing and collection, in which tax bills
are hand-written by inspectors and clerks and hand-delivered by tax constables, is prone to errors
and/or manipulation in crediting collections.
In this context, performance pay has the potential to induce tax officials to raise collections.
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While this could be due to greater effort in tracking new properties and uncovering physical and
usage changes that increase tax assessments, anecdotal evidence suggests that collectors likely have
substantial private information regarding a property’s true tax liability already, which they use for
extracting bribes rather than assessing higher taxes. They may choose to only reveal (parts of) this
information to the authorities when faced with significant opportunity for rewards. An extreme
form of such information disclosure is revealing the existence of (newly constructed) properties
and formally adding them to tax registers (recall there is no automatic process though which this
happens). In addition, tax collectors may increase valuations by revealing the true, higher tax
valuation of a property or denying (incorrectly provided) exemptions. The next section formalizes
these incentives to strategically disclose information within a standard model of collusion.
3 Theory
Consider a simple setting where a taxpayer i faces a true tax liability τ∗i . The tax inspector
knows τ∗i , but can instead choose to report a lower tax liability to the government, τi. The tax
inspector receives an incentive payment that is a constant fraction r of actual taxes paid, i.e. rτi.
Both taxpayer and tax inspector face costs from colluding to report τi < τ∗i . The taxpayer’s
cost of accepting a reduced tax liability is αi (τ∗i − τi) and the tax inspector’s cost of giving a
reduced tax liability is βi (τ∗i − τi).2 For example, if a taxpayer evades taxation, their property can
be sealed and unavailable for use; the utility loss from the expected loss of use of the property for
each dollar of tax evasion is captured by αi. Similarly, a tax official could in theory be jailed for
accepting bribes, or he may just experience a utility loss from being dishonest; the utility loss of
this punishment for the tax collector for each dollar of tax evasion is captured by βi. We allow αi
and βi to differ for each individual taxpayer-inspector pairing i.
We assume that the taxpayer and the tax inspector engage in Nash bargaining, with the taxpayer
potentially paying a bribe bi as a transfer to tax inspector. If no agreement is reached, the taxpayer
receives payoff −τ∗i and the tax inspector receives payoff rτ∗i . If an agreement is reached, the
taxpayer receives payoff −τi−αi (τ∗i − τi)−bi and the tax inspector receives payoff rτi−βi (τ∗i − τi)+
bi.
To arrive at the solution, note that the joint surplus from agreement is
τ∗i − τi − αi (τ∗i − τi) + r(τi − τ∗i )− βi (τ∗i − τi) (3.1)
2While the costs are modeled in terms of deviations from the true tax liability, i.e. α (τ∗i − τi), an alternative
formulation would have costs in terms of bribes, i.e. to value bribes αibi instead of bi, so that bribes are less valuable
than cash. This could represent the fact that there is some chance bribes are detected, or that one needs to launder
bribe money, which makes it less valuable than legal money. In Appendix A.2, we show similar qualitative results
using this alternative specification of costs.
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which can be rewritten as
−τi (1− αi − βi − r) + (1− αi − βi − r) τ∗i (3.2)
This equation shows that if
r + αi + βi < 1 (3.3)
the joint surplus is maximized at τi = 0 (full collusion); otherwise the joint surplus is maximized
at τi = τ∗i .
Suppose that γi is the bargaining weight of the taxpayer (and 1− γi is the bargaining weight of
the inspector). If collusion takes place, the bribe paid is such that each side receives their outside
option plus their share of the surplus. This implies that the bribe the taxpayer pays to the tax
inspector is
bi = [(βi + r) γi + (1− γi) (1− αi)] τ∗i (3.4)
What are the implications for tax revenue and bribes of moving from no incentive (r = 0)
to positive incentive payments r? This simple framework shows that it depends on whether the
equilibrium shifts from the collusive equilibrium to the non-collusive equilibrium. So long as r +
αi+βi < 1 and γi > 0, increasing the incentive rate increases bribes (since the taxpayer now has to
compensate the inspector for the foregone incentive payments). On the other hand, if increasing r
means that the threshold is crossed such that r+αi+βi > 1, then collusion disappears, bribes fall to
zero, and tax revenue increases from 0 to τ∗i . The result that bribes increase with incentives to the
tax collector, but that collusion may disappear if incentives are sufficiently great, is closely related
to Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996), who study bribes between politicians and
managers of firms as part of their analysis of privatizations.
Since there is heterogeneity in αi and βi, the aggregate response of tax revenue will depend on
the fraction of households induced to switch from the collusive to non-collusive equilibrium. Denote
by f (α, β, τ∗) the joint distribution of α, β and τ∗ in the population. Then the increase in total
tax revenue, T , in response to an increase in r is given by
dT
dr
=
˚
r+α+β=1,τ∗∈(0,∞)
τ∗f (α, β, τ∗) dαdβdτ∗
=
¨
α,τ∗,
τ∗f (α, 1− r − α, τ∗) dαdτ∗ (3.5)
Equation (3.5) makes clear that the change in tax revenue depends on the density of taxpayers
that are just indifferent between colluding and not colluding, and the average tax liability of those
households.
The welfare implications depend on the degree to which the costs from avoidance, α and β, are
8
social costs or private costs (Chetty 2009). To the extent that they represent social costs (i.e. they
are utility costs from being dishonest or caught cheating, and so represent real costs, as opposed
to fines, which would just be transfers), then assuming equal welfare weights on taxpayers and tax
inspectors, the social welfare gain from the increase in r is equal to the increase in tax revenue
less the cost of the incentive payments.3 To see this, write social welfare as the net surplus of
the taxpayer, tax inspector, and government for each taxpayer-tax inspector pair and integrate as
follows:
W =
˚
α,β,τ∗
−τ − α (τ∗ − τ)− b︸ ︷︷ ︸
taxpayer
+ rτ − βi (τ∗ − τ) + b︸ ︷︷ ︸
taxinspector
+ τ − rτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
government
 f(α, β, τ∗)dαdβdτ∗ (3.6)
Note whether the costs are social costs (like sealing a property) or private costs (like fines) is a
policy choice, and the change in social welfare will be different to the extent that these are private
costs (see Chetty (2009) for a more detailed discussion).
Assuming equal social welfare weights, so that the change in social welfare is really just the
change in deadweight loss, when we change r, the only change in social welfare comes from those
taxpayer-tax inspector pairs i induced to switch from collusion to non-collusion; for pairs that
remain collusive, bribes increase, but this is just a transfer and does not affect social welfare.
Similarly, for pairs that remain non-collusive, there is no change in overall welfare since overall
taxes paid are unchanged (and there are no bribes) and the greater incentive payments made
to the tax collector are entirely offset by the cost of these payments to the government. Those
taxpayer-tax inspector pairs induced to change by a marginal increase in r are those that were
just indifferent between colluding and not colluding (i.e. had αi + βi + r = 1), so a switch from
collusion to non-collusion does not change the sum of taxpayer and tax inspector utility. The
government, however, experiences a first-order utility change equal to the tax revenues it collects
less the incentive payment it needs to pay out. The fact that social welfare is equal to the net
change in the government’s fiscal position is related to the classic result by Feldstein (1999), with
the exception that in this case, the “fiscal externality” is tax revenue net of incentive payments.
The model presented here was simplified for ease of exposition, in that the costs to reducing
tax liability are linear. Linearity is not crucial; as we outline in model with more general cost
functions (which also avoids the corner solutions inherent in the linear case) in Appendix A.1, all
we need for the key qualitative patterns is that the marginal costs of collusion to both parties are
weakly positively increasing in τ∗i − τi. The key difference in this generalized model is that the
increase in revenue from an increase in r comes not just from households that switch from collusive
3For example, in Pakistan, if one refuses to pay property taxes, the property might be sealed so no one could
use it until the taxes are paid; this represents a real social cost, since the property is unusable during this period.
If the government has different welfare weights for payments from taxpayers, bribes received by taxpayers, and tax
revenues received by the government, then the welfare formula would be more complex and would need to take these
differences into account.
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to non-collusive (as in equation (3.5)), but also from households that continue to collude, but now
collude a bit less than before. Welfare analysis, however, will be similar.
Note that by assuming that the tax inspector knows τ∗i , we have suppressed both an effort and
an overtaxation/extortion margin. The effort margin recognizes that with more effort tax inspectors
could discover more properties or learn a property’s true tax liability. We suppress it in the model
since models of increased effort under incentives are well understood, and we wish to focus on the
bargaining implications, though changes in effort could be possible in our context as well. We
give one example in Appendix A.2 of how our framework could be extended to include an effort
component. As we show in that case, including an effort margin does not yield any qualitatively
different insights. While the overtaxation margin is conceptually interesting, in practice this appears
less common (as we will show below, our property survey suggests the typical property is in fact
under-taxed, not overtaxed) and we therefore do not incorporate it in the model.
4 Design
This section presents the design of the performance pay mechanisms introduced and the exper-
imental design of the study. Section 4.1 describes the performance pay program, and Section 4.2
describes the randomization and balance check.
4.1 Performance pay design
Tax circles were randomly allocated into one of three performance pay schemes: the Revenue,
Revenue Plus, and Flexible Bonus schemes. A total of approximately 70 circles were allocated
to each scheme (50 each in the first year and an additional 20 each in the second year). In
addition, in the second year, two new treatments were added: a performance pay scheme for
supervisory personnel, and an “information-only” scheme that replicated the information, meetings,
and perceived salience of the Revenue scheme, but without any financial payments. We describe
each scheme below and then discuss tax officials’ understanding of the schemes and the schemes’
credibility.
4.1.1 Revenue-based
This performance pay group rewarded tax circle staff (inspectors, constables, and clerks) based
on the revenue they collected above a predefined benchmark. The benchmark for each circle was
generated using historical revenue data for that circle. Specifically, each tax staff member continued
to receive his or her current base salary, plus a bonus calculated by the following formula:
Bonusc = αcmax(Revenuec −Benchmarkc, 0) (4.1)
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where the bonus rate αc is 40% for circles below the 50th percentile in baseline revenue, 30% for
circles between the 50th and 75th percentiles, and 20% for circles above the 75th percentile. The
differential bonus rates were put in place for equity considerations, i.e. staff in larger circles were
compensated at a lower rate than those in smaller circles, where it was perceived to be more difficult
to raise a given amount of revenue. It is important to note that this scheme treated increased
collections due to expansion of the tax base (new properties) or increased collection on the current
base (higher recovery rates) symmetrically. Benchmarks were generated using a three-year average
of historical collections, adjusted for the normal rate of increase in collections, and were designed
such that most circles would be “in-the-money” and face linear incentives on the margin.4 Since
most inspectors are rotated to new circles every two to three years, the use of two to four lags of
revenue collection in determining benchmarks means that ratchet effects should not be a first-order
concern, since by the time higher revenue collection starts to impact benchmarks substantially, the
inspector would likely be in a different circle and not subject to those benchmarks.
As each tax circle staff consists of three members, the bonus was divided 40%-30%-30% among
inspector, constable, and clerk, respectively. On net, with a 30% average incentive payment to the
group and this division among the three group members, each individual inspector, constable, and
clerk faced a roughly 10% individual marginal incentive. Payments for all incentive schemes were
restricted to staff who were posted in the circle at the time of randomization, and staff were no
longer eligible to receive payments if they were transferred to a non-incentivized circle.
4.1.2 Revenue Plus
The Revenue Plus scheme was similar to the Revenue-based scheme, but included additional
incentives (the “plus” component) to help address the multitasking problem inherent in the tax
collector’s job (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Specifically, in addition to maximizing revenue
collected, the government also cares about how people feel they are treated by the tax department
and whether taxes are assessed accurately.
To address these concerns, in addition to rewarding on revenue using the identical formula as in
the Revenue scheme, this scheme adjusted pay based on taxpayer satisfaction and accuracy of tax
assessments. Circles in the scheme were ranked based on the accuracy and satisfaction measures and
4Specifically, in the first year (FY11-12), the benchmark was the three year average of revenues from FY07-08,
FY08-09, and FY09-10, plus 10%. Since the rate of increase in collections averaged about 8% per year, the benchmark
should be approximately 13% below the average revenue under business-as-usual, so that almost all circles would
be in-the-money and face linear incentives on the margin. The adjustment rate was increased slightly in Year 2
in light of the growth rates observed in Year 1, so that in the second year (FY12-13), the historical benchmark
was the three year average of revenues from FY08-09, FY09-10, and FY10-11, plus 20%. Note that in the first
year, there were separate benchmarks for current-year tax collection and arrears collection, so that the formula
was Incentivec = αcmax(CurrentY earRevenuec − CurrentY earBenchmarkc, 0) + αcmax(ArrearsRevenuec −
ArrearsBenchmarkc, 0). Given that inspectors have some leeway in classifying revenue into current or arrears, but
no flexibility in total revenue (since it must match the amount of money deposited into the bank), in the second year,
incentives were simplified to be based simply on the total revenue.
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divided into three equal-sized groups. Circle staff were paid as in the Revenue treatment, but the
top group received an additional bonus equal to about 0.75 times their base salary, and the bottom
group lost 0.75 times their average base salary.5 By design the total payments under the scheme
could never be negative (that is, base salary was never at risk; an inspector in the bottom group
might receive 0 from the scheme but would never forfeit his base salary); otherwise, (conditional on
the same revenue increase) average payments would be identical between the Revenue and Revenue
Plus schemes.6
The satisfaction and assessment accuracy measures were based on an independent survey of
12,000 randomly sampled properties (described in Section 5.1). Taxpayer satisfaction was mea-
sured based on two survey questions about the quality and results of interactions with the tax
department.7 Accuracy was measured as 1 minus the absolute value of the difference between
GARV as measured by the survey and the official GARV as measured from the tax department’s
administrative records, divided by the average of these two values.8 Since this “Plus” component
relies on third party surveys and could also lead to losing the performance pay earned due to in-
creased tax collections, it effectively constitutes an audit component (though was not referred to
as such so as to maintain better optics).
4.1.3 Flexible Bonus
The third scheme was designed to be analogous to the way bonuses work in the private sector for
many complex jobs, such as those in Wall Street firms: managers distributed a fixed bonus pool to
talented employees based on all factors (including subjective ones) they observe.9 In this treatment,
staff were again divided into three groups and pay was determined by group (just as in the Revenue
Plus scheme), but rather than have their pay determined by an ex-ante specified formula, they were
divided by their performance as ranked by a departmental “Performance Evaluation Committee”
(PEC) comprised of senior tax officials. Everyone in the treatment provisionally earned a base
5Inspectors in the top group received an extra Rs. 15,000 per month, and constables and clerks received an extra
Rs. 11,500 per month; those in the bottom group lost an equivalent amount.
6To the extent that tax officials are risk-neutral, or they are risk averse but have CARA utility with cost of effort
expressible in monetary terms, the additional variance induced by the Plus scheme should not affect their choices
other than through the multi-tasking channel. Relaxing the assumptions of risk-neutrality or CARA utility, however,
could allow there to be direct effects from the increased variance due to the Plus component on the return to revenue
from the effort component.
7The questions were “In your opinion, what has been the overall quality of service offered by this department
to this property?” and “In your personal dealings with members of this department, how satisfied are you with the
outcomes?” Each question was answered on a 1 to 5 scale.
8In the first year, this measure was noisier due to survey and measurement logistics that were resolved by the
second year. Therefore in the first year we instead calculated accuracy by correlating Log GARV in the official register
with Log GARV according to the survey, which was more robust to being off by a constant.
9For example, managers might be able to observe effort in addition to outcomes; they also might have information
that certain areas were more difficult. While subjective assessments can potentially better match the complexities
of real jobs, they can be less effective than formulaic systems if workers do not trust the managers to implement
them properly, if managers play favorites, or if managers and workers disagree about the subjective component of
performance (Baker et al. 1994, Prendergast and Topel 1996, Prendergast 1999, MacLeod 2003).
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salary supplement roughly equal to their average salary.10 At the end of the year, adjustments
were made just as in the Revenue Plus scheme: the top third of circles received an additional bonus
equal to approximately 0.75 times their base salary, and the bottom group lost approximately 0.75
times their average base salary.
In determining payments under this scheme, the PEC was allowed to use any criteria it chose,
so long as it could document a reason behind them, and the committee was provided all of the same
information used in the Revenue Plus treatment (increase in revenue over benchmarks, customer
satisfaction, and accuracy of assessments). The main differences between the Flexible Bonus and
Revenue Plus schemes were that the objective revenue-based formula was replaced by a fixed
increase in base salary (with an end of year bonus), and that the grouping was made by the
Performance Evaluation Committee as it saw fit with relatively few restrictions.
Although the official rules allowed the PEC full flexibility in using subjective criteria, they in
fact created a (richer) formula for ranking circles, using the following indicators and weights (in
parentheses): increase in revenue collected (40 percent), increase in tax base (25 percent), accuracy
of assessment (15 percent), subjective director’s rating (10 percent), and customer satisfaction (10
percent). This was publicized about 6 months after the intervention began, so by the beginning of
Year 2, inspectors should have been fully aware of the assessment criteria. The two additional cri-
teria (compared to Revenue Plus) were tax base increases and the subjective director’s assessment.
On net, the correlation between the Performance Evaluation Committee ranking and the ranking
of payments that would have been generated under the Revenue Plus formula was 0.269 in Year 2.
4.1.4 Additional treatments
Two additional treatments were introduced in the second year of the program (FY12-13). The
“information-only treatment” (70 circles) was intended to capture the part of the effect that arises
from all aspects of treatment besides the monetary incentives. Staff from these circles went through
the same process as in the Revenue treatment (including receiving quarterly reports on collections
above their historically-predicted benchmarks and attending progress quarterly meetings), but with
no corresponding incentive payments. While the quarterly reports just repackaged information that
staff already had, the reports presented the information in a more systematic format, which may
have increased its salience. Furthermore, the act of attending the quarterly meetings may have led
circle staff to believe that they were being monitored more carefully. The information-only scheme
nets out these effects from the direct impact of the payments per se in the performance-based
incentives.
In addition, a supervisor’s performance pay scheme was introduced in the second year. This was
identical to the Revenue scheme, but applied to Assistant Excise and Taxation officers (AETOs),
10In the first year, the base salary supplement was Rs. 30,000 for inspectors and Rs. 23,000 for constables and
clerks, i.e. closer to one and a half times base pay. This figure was adjusted in the second year to Rs. 22,000 and Rs.
16,500 so that the three schemes generated roughly equal average honorariums.
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who supervise the circle staff, and Excise and Taxation officers (ETOs), who supervise AETOs.
Randomization was done by ETO, with 26 treatments and 25 controls. All AETOs working under
selected ETOs were included. Payments were calculated based on the average increase in revenue
over benchmarks for circles under their supervision. The bonus rate was determined by average
circle size, and each supervisor received a 50 percent share of all imputed bonus payments (recall an
inspector’s share was 40%). Since this intervention was randomized by ETO (of which there are only
51), whereas the circle-level intervention was randomized by circle (with almost 500 circles), this
intervention will have substantially lower statistical power than the main circle-level treatments.
4.1.5 Knowledge and Credibility
To ensure that collectors understood the specifics of the scheme they were in, we carried out
detailed trainings at the start of the year, followed by quizzes and refresher trainings throughout. By
seven months after treatments started, quiz results revealed that virtually all inspectors understood
the scheme and could accurately calculate payments. A survey of all inspectors (treatment and
control) confirmed that inspectors could identify whether they would receive payments, and which
scheme they were in. To ensure that inspectors believed that payments would actually be made,
the project was officially approved by the Chief Minister (the highest political authority in the
province). A small pilot was conducted (and payments made) in 11 circles for an entire year before
the main experiment began, and payments were made quarterly throughout the main experiment.
4.2 Randomization Design and Balance Checks
The randomization was carried out through public lotteries, with representatives from the tax
department present. This helped minimize any perceived bias, especially since the performance
pay schemes were popular (most staff wanted to opt-in). To reduce any concerns about differential
selection across the schemes while maintaining informed consent, the lottery was conducted in two
stages. In the first stage, circles were selected to participate in the project and staff consent was
sought. Staff were told about the three possible schemes, and were told that a second lottery would
determine which scheme they would be assigned to.11 Once consent was obtained, a second lottery
assigned consented circles to particular incentive schemes. Over 95% of circle staff selected in the
first lottery consented. Given the high consent rates in the first year, both stages were conducted
in a single lottery in Year 2. The lotteries were held as close as possible after the start of the fiscal
year on July 1.
Table 1 shows the experimental design. In Year 1, 160 circles were selected in the first ballot,
to be divided equally into one of three treatments. In Year 2, an additional 58 were selected
and divided into the same three treatments. The circles selected in Year 1 remained in the same
11Given the crucial role played by the inspector in collecting tax, the circle as a whole could only participate if
the inspector consented. Constables or clerks could individually opt out of the scheme, though this rarely happened.
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treatment, and new inspectors who had previously transferred into these circles became eligible
for performance pay in Year 2.12 In addition, 70 circles were selected for the information-only
treatment. Each lottery was stratified with 19 strata based on the 11 administrative divisions of
the province and – for all but the smallest few divisions– circle size.
Appendix Table 11 compares the selected circles to controls on baseline characteristics in the
administrative data based on the randomization at the end of Year 2. Out of the 42 comparisons
(7 variables * 6 columns), only 1 is significant at the 5 percent level (the coefficient on log non-
exemption rate for the Flexible Bonus scheme).13
5 Data and Empirical Methodology
5.1 Data
We use two main sources of data: circle-level administrative data for our main measures of tax
performance, and property/taxpayer-level data based on a survey we conducted to obtain measures
of accuracy of tax assessment, customer satisfaction, and corruption. Appendix B provides further
details on both datasets, including the additional verification checks we ran on the administrative
data, how we addressed circles with boundary changes, details of the survey, and variable definitions.
Here we highlight a few of these aspects.
The administrative data is based on the quarterly reports that each inspector files, which show
their overall collections (separately for current year and past years/arrears collections) and the total
assessed tax base. We digitized these reports for all tax circles and selected a random sample to
be verified each year by aggregating (thousands of) bank-verified receipts of individual payments.
We found no statistically or economically significant discrepancy between the administrative data
and our independent verifications.
Summary statistics for key variables from the administrative data are shown in Panel A of
Table 2 for the second year of the experiment (FY12-13); summary statistics for additional years
and variables can be found in the Appendix. Several observations are worth noting. First, current
year revenues are substantially larger than arrears (i.e. collections against past years’ unpaid taxes)
– the mean of log current revenues is 15.52 compared with just 13.91 for log arrears, implying that,
on average, current revenue is about 5 times as large as arrears. This suggests that the main
impacts on total revenue will likely be felt through increases in current year revenue. Second, there
12Since this was not part of the policy initially (we had made clear that anyone transferring in during the year
would not be part of the treatment) there is not much concern that staff were strategically transferring in the hope
that they would be eligible in the second year.
13Looking scheme by scheme, the joint balance test shows statistical significance in one of the schemes (Revenue
Plus) compared to pure controls, even though none of the individual covariates are statistically significantly different.
In the Appendix Tables we show that the main average effects of incentives do not seem to be driven by this one sub-
treatment (Appendix J), and that controlling for the variables included in the balance table does not meaningfully
change the results (Appendix K).
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is much more variation in arrears – the standard deviation in log arrears is about 1.5 times that of
log current revenue – implying that detecting effects on arrears statistically will be more difficult.
The log recovery rate (the log of tax revenue divided by the tax base net of exemptions) is -0.14
for current year taxes, which implies that about 85 percent of all taxes that are demanded by the
government are in fact paid. Thus while non-payment is a substantial issue (a typical developed
country government would not be satisfied with a 15 percent non-payment rate of property taxes),14
it is still the case that the bulk of taxpayers do in fact pay the tax bills they receive. Thus any
potential evasion may come from under-assessment of properties (as we will see below) rather than
just flagrant disregard of issued tax notices.
The second primary data source is the property survey we conducted at the end of the two year
period. This survey provides our main non-revenue outcomes (taxpayer satisfaction measures and
tax assessment accuracy), as well as owner/property characteristics that help examine heteroge-
neous effects. The survey is based on two distinct samples. The first, which we will refer to as the
“general population sample,” consists of roughly 12,000 properties selected by randomly sampling
5 GPS coordinates in each circle and then surveying a total of 5 properties around that coordinate.
These properties therefore represent the picture for the typical property in a tax circle. The second
sample, which we will refer to as the “reassessed sample,” consists of slightly more that 4,000 prop-
erties (roughly 10 per circle) which were sampled from an administrative list of properties that are
newly assessed or reassessed. These properties were then located in the field and surveyed. This
over-samples the (few) properties that experience such changes each year so we can examine the
impacts on such properties separately.
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for properties from the general population
sample. Several facts are worth noting. First, 84 percent of properties we randomly sampled in the
field were successfully located on the tax registers. While there are a substantial number of untaxed
properties, it is not the case that only a few properties are on the tax rolls. Second, conditional on
being on the tax rolls, on average properties appear under-taxed. We focus on the Gross Annual
Rental Value (GARV ) of the property, which is the main measure of a property’s tax value, before
exemptions and reductions are applied.15 To measure under or over taxation, we focus on the “tax
gap,” defined as
TaxGap = GARVInspector −GARVSurvey(GARVInspector +GARVSurvey) (5.1)
14For example, on average from 2010 to 2013, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts collected almost exactly 100
percent of all property taxes due (City of Cambridge 2014). The collection rate in Pakistan is more comparable
to Detroit, Michigan, which had an 80 percent average property tax collection rate from 2010 to 2013 and filed for
bankruptcy (City of Detroit, Michigan 2013).
15We focus on GARV, rather than tax assessed, because nonlinearities in the tax formula mean that there is
substantially more measurement error in tax assessed than in GARV. For example, if the land area is less than 5
marla (1,361 square feet), non-rented, residential properties are completely exempt from tax. By contrast, GARV
is a continuous function of the underlying property characteristics and hence is much more robust to measurement
error.
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This captures the difference between what the inspector officially reported and what was obtained
through our own survey. Our measure of inaccuracy is the absolute value of the tax gap. On
average, inaccuracy is 0.34, indicating substantial disagreement between the two measures. The
tax gap has a mean value of -0.10, suggesting that under-taxation is prevalent in our population.16
Corruption also appears to be prevalent. On average, respondents report that annual bribes paid
for a property similar to theirs are around Rs. 2,000 (US $20) – about half of the amount they report
paying in property taxes. Bribes are frequent – when asked how many times a typical property
owner would need to bribe the property tax department, the mean is 0.76 bribes paid per year. On
the other hand, respondents are not wildly unsatisfied with service from the tax department – on
a 0-1 scale, the average response is 0.53 for quality of service and 0.55 for satisfaction.17 Of course,
this could be consistent with corruption: a respondent might be “satisfied” if he was able to reduce
his official tax liability by paying a bribe.
In addition to these two primary sources of data, in some of the appendix tables we also make
use of a short phone-based survey of inspectors where we gathered basic information about the
self-reported effort and perceived supervisory support and pressure felt by the tax inspectors.
5.2 Empirical Methodology
Since we are evaluating a randomized experiment, the empirical methodology is straightforward.
We estimate 2SLS regressions, where the endogenous variable is the treatment status at any point
in time and the instruments are the results of the lottery.18 Our primary specification for assessing
circle-level outcomes using the administrative data is
lnYcst = αs + βTreatmentcst + γ lnYcs0 + cst (5.2)
where Ycst is the outcome of interest for circle c in stratum s at time t, and Treatmentcst is a
continuous variable that takes values from 0 to 1 that represents the fraction of treated circle staff
present in circle c in the last quarter of the given fiscal year. Ycs0 is the value of the outcome
variable at baseline (i.e. in the fiscal year prior to randomization). Treatment is instrumented
by a binary variable that represents the circle’s randomization status into any one of the three
16Given the way it is normalized, an average Tax Gap of -0.10 means that, on average, the inspector’s assessment
is 19% less than the survey’s estimate.
17One might be concerned that the quality and satisfaction variables are simply picking up noise. However, Panel
A of Appendix Table 12 shows that the satisfaction and quality measures are internally consistent: that is, households
who report higher satisfaction report higher quality of service, and households that report higher quality report lower
bribes, and so on. More importantly, households in a circle tend to agree with each other. Panel B of Appendix Table
12 regresses these measures on what other respondents in the same circle report: people report high satisfaction when
others in their neighborhood report high satisfaction, report high bribes when others report high bribes, and so on.
18The reason the treatment status is not exactly equal to the lottery results is that a small number of circles (8
out of 482) did not consent to participate, and because some circle staff lost eligibility to continue in the scheme after
they were transferred out to another circle.
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incentive schemes.19 We include stratum fixed effects (αs) given the lottery was stratified by these
strata. All regressions based on administrative data are run using circle boundaries that existed at
the time of randomization. We report robust standard errors clustered at the level of the robust
partition of circles, i.e. the maximum set of circles that have been involved together in a set of
splits and merges since randomization.
To estimate the impact of the separate sub-treatments, we estimate the analogous regression
separately by treatment:20
lnYcst = αs + β1Revenuecst + β2RevenueP luscst + β3FlexibleBonuscst + γ lnYcs0 + cst (5.3)
For survey-based outcomes, we run regressions at the property level. When examining the
general population sample, we run regressions of the form:
Yics = αs + βTreatmentcs + ics (5.4)
where i is an individual property. As above, we instrument for Treatment with the randomization
results.21 We include stratum fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the circle level. When
available, we include controls for baseline level outcome variables.22
For regressions where we are interested in the difference between reassessed and new properties
and regular properties, we include both the general sample and the reassessed sample (which
includes newly assessed properties and those whose valuations changed), and then estimate :
19Reduced-form versions of the main table can be found as Appendix Tables 3-G1 and 4-G1. Note also that
the information-only scheme is not included as a treatment, but is instead included as part of the control group to
maximize statistical power. Appendix Tables 3-I through 7-I re-estimate the tables in the paper where, instead, the
information treatment is separated out, so performance pay treatments are compared only to pure controls, with
qualitatively similar results.
20In such regressions, in addition to reporting β1, β2, and β3, we report several other statistics to guide the
analysis. In particular, we report the p-values for a test of the joint statistical significance of the incentive schemes
(i.e. a test of the null that β1 = β2 = β3 = 0) and a test that the three schemes are identical (i.e. a test of the null
that β1 = β2 = β3). We also report p-values from a test of whether the schemes that dealt with multi-tasking are
identical to those that did not (i.e. a test of the null that β1 = β2+β32 ), and from a test of whether the scheme that
used subjective information from the department is identical to the formulaic schemes (i.e. a test of the null that
β3 = β1+β22 ).21Regressions based on survey data are run using circles boundaries when the sample of properties was drawn,
which happened in the middle of the second fiscal year of the study.
22Our sampling strategy was to randomly draw 5 initial GPS coordinates from within the boundary of a tax circle.
We then survey the property closest to that point and then following a left-hand rule (or if that is not possible, a
right hand one) survey an additional four properties. A potential concern is that we may be oversampling larger
properties since a randomly chosen GPS point is more likely to fall inside a larger property. While this may be true
for the first sampled point, we have confirmed that it is not true of subsequent properties i.e. there is very little
correlation between the land area of the first property (chosen by GPS point) and the subsequent properties (chosen
by moving to the left). As a robustness exercise we therefore redo our estimates after dropping the first sampled
point and using only the remaining points, and find that our results are qualitatively similar. See Appendix Tables
8-L and 6-L.
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Yics = αc + β1Treatmentc ∗ReAssessedic + β2ReAssessedic + ic (5.5)
where ReAssessed is a dummy that is 1 if a property was sampled from the list of properties
whose valuation was changed (we do not distinguish in this regression between properties whose
tax valuation was changed and newly assessed properties; both are captured by ReAssessed).
Note that unlike equation (5.4), we now include circle fixed effects (αc) to capture fixed differences
among circles between properties. We examine the analogue of equation (5.3) when we examine
sub-treatments.
In interpreting equation (5.5), it is important to note that which properties are reassessed
is potentially an outcome of the treatment. As such, the coefficient β1 includes two margins of
treatment effects – an extensive margin effect (i.e. the type/number of properties revalued can
be impacted) and an intensive margin effect (a given reassessed property may now be dealt with
differently). For example, if Yics is the amount of bribes paid, the coefficient β1 in equation (5.5)
shows how the difference in bribes paid between reassessed and non-reassessed properties changes
in treatment versus control circles. As outlined in the conceptual framework, this net effect β1
will include both margins (i.e. (i) the average bribe amount changes as the set/type of people who
collude changes and (ii) conditional on collusion, the bribe amount changes). To shed some light on
these effects, in Section 6.2.1 we will also examine how the composition of those in the reassessed
sample changes by estimating equation (5.5) on fixed characteristics of reassessed properties.
6 Results
In Section 6.1, we examine the impacts of the performance pay schemes on the key revenue and
non-revenue outcomes of interest. Section 6.2 then probes the mechanisms through which changes
in tax base occur in light of the model in Section 3. While we focus on the pay-for-performance
aspect of the schemes, (i.e., price effects), Section 6.3 considers a variety of alternative explanations
for the results, such as perceptions of additional monitoring, income effects, and interactions with
supervisors. Section 6.4 concludes with a discussion of cost-effectiveness.
6.1 Main impacts
6.1.1 Impacts on Revenue Outcomes
Table 3 considers the impact of the performance pay schemes on (log) revenue at the end of
each of the two years of the study. We first consider the impact on total revenue (columns 1 and 4).
The remaining columns break this down into revenue derived from current year taxes and revenue
from arrears. Current year revenue is about 5 times larger than arrears revenue. Arrears revenue
is also substantially more variable over time, which is why the standard errors are larger. Panel A
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reports the impact where we pool all three performance pay schemes and Panel B shows the impact
for the schemes separately.
We find substantial impacts of performance pay on total revenue collected. Panel A, column
1 shows that compared to controls, revenue increased by 9.1 log points in treatment circles in the
first year, and column 4 shows an increase of 9.4 log points in the second year. To interpret the
magnitude, note that, on average, control circles experienced an increase in total revenue of about
25 log points between the baseline year and the end of the second year. Exponentiating, this implies
that control circles grew by about 28% over the 2 years, and treatment circles grew by about 41%.
Incentives thus led to a 13 percentage point increase in the growth rate, or a 46 percent higher rate
of growth, over the 2 years of the experiment.
Examining the effects separately by current and arrears revenue, we find that the impact on
current year revenue collection is 7.3 log points in Year 1 and 9.1 log points in Year 2. In contrast,
there is a 15.2 log point increase in arrears revenue in Year 1, which falls to 11.3 log points (and
is no longer statistically significant) in Year 2. Although these changes over the years are not
statistically distinguishable, the point estimates suggest that inspectors, who exhausted much of
the available pools of easily collectable arrears in the first year, switched their focus to increasing
current year collection in the second year.
Separating the results by the three compensation schemes (Panel B), we see that, as one might
expect, schemes that directly reward on revenue collection have a larger impact on revenue collected.
Looking at current year revenue (where we have much more precise estimates for the aforementioned
reasons), Column 5 shows that by the end of Year 2, Revenue circles collected 15.2 log points more
revenue than control circles, compared to a 8.1 log point increase in Revenue Plus circles and a
3.5 log point increase in Flexible Bonus circles. We can reject equality of these coefficients at the
10% level. When we test for equality between Revenue and an average of the multitasking schemes
we are also able to reject equality (p-value < 0.05). The magnitudes for the Revenue scheme are
large: compared to the 39 percent average growth in current year revenue in control areas, revenue
in Revenue circles grew by 62 percent. This implies that Revenue circles had a 58 percent (23
percentage point) higher growth rate in current revenue over 2 years than controls. The impact on
total revenue collection–including arrears–was substantial as well: Revenue circles had 62 percent
higher growth in than controls.
Our results show that performance pay schemes did lead to large increases in revenue, with
schemes that rewarded more on revenue collected seeing even larger increases. While our data
verification checks gives us confidence that these schemes did in fact bring in real money, one
potential concern is that these impacts might be due to temporary (and unreasonable) pressures put
on taxpayers that could ultimately be undone through appeals (see e.g. Das-Gupta and Mookherjee
1998). To investigate this we randomly sampled 22 circles, one incentive and one control in each
of the 11 divisions, at the end of the second year of the experiment, and investigated all appeals
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that had been filed to date since the start of the experiment. We find that appeals are much too
small (at most 1.5 percent of annual total revenues) to substantially change the results here, and
find no economically meaningful or statistically significant differences in appeals rates or amounts
between treatment and control areas.
6.1.2 Impacts on Non-Revenue Outcomes
To the extent that high powered incentives lead to excessive pressure to collect taxes and/or
over-taxation/extortion, one may be concerned that the performance pay schemes – especially the
Revenue scheme – could adversely impact taxpayer satisfaction and assessment accuracy. Table 4
investigates these issues, and shows little evidence for such effects.
We examine the impact on measures of taxpayer satisfaction and accuracy of tax assessment
using property-level survey data. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 examine the two measures of taxpayer
satisfaction in which we asked the respondent how they rated the “quality of service” of the tax
department and how “satisfied” they were with their service. These are the exact measures which
were incentivized in the Revenue Plus scheme, so it is instructive to examine not just whether they
worsen in the incentive treatments in general, but whether the Revenue Plus scheme, and perhaps
the Flexible Bonus scheme, mitigates this effect.
Panel A shows no statistically or economically meaningful treatment effect for either measure.
In particular, on a 0-1 scale, the point estimates are -0.006 for quality of service and -0.011 for
satisfaction, and we can reject a change in either measure of about 0.04 or larger.
Panel B examines the impacts separately for each scheme and finds the estimates for the Flexible
Bonus are negative (-0.060 and -0.053 for quality and satisfaction, respectively), whereas the point
estimates for Revenue Plus are positive (0.040 and 0.029, respectively). Although the results for
each scheme are generally not statistically significant, one can reject the null hypothesis of equality
of the three schemes, or the null that that the Flexible Bonus scheme is equal to the other schemes.
The estimates suggest that the Revenue Plus treatment, which explicitly incentivized quality and
satisfaction, may have in fact led to higher levels of both compared to the Revenue and Flexible
Bonus incentive schemes, though the magnitude of this impact is relatively small. The Flexible
Bonus not only had the lowest performance in terms of revenue raised for the government, but also
had worse outcomes on these other dimensions as well.
The zero average results on quality and satisfaction are quite robust. In particular, we show in
Appendix Table 4-G2 that the results are qualitatively unchanged if we use ordered probit models
instead of the linearized variable with OLS or control for observable property characteristics (area,
usage etc.).
In addition to these satisfaction measures, we examined other metrics that may reflect general
attitudes towards the government, such as quality and satisfaction with other departments and
stated preference for the incumbent party (based on self-reported voting behavior). These are
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shown in Appendix Table 13. In general, none of these metrics show meaningful differences between
treatment and control. The only notable difference is that the pattern that Revenue Plus areas
show higher satisfaction and quality of service appears generalized to other departments beyond just
tax, suggesting that there may be positive spillovers, which is consistent with citizens attributing
a positive interaction in one government service to other related services.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 examine the second main non-revenue dimension, the inaccuracy
of tax assessment of the property. The results show no changes in inaccuracy or the tax gap overall
(Panel A). When we explore the sub-treatments (Panel B), we do get some indication that Revenue
Plus may have increased overall inaccuracy, although this does not seem to have an impact on the
tax gap, which suggests that it may have raised both under- and over-taxation for the full sample
of properties. It is important to note, however, that this is the average effect for all properties.
One potential reason we may not detect changes in this metric is that the number of properties
affected may be small; we explore this in more detail when we focus on reassessed properties in
Section 6.2.2 below.
On net, there are two key conclusions from the results thus far. First, compared to control
circles, we find that the incentives overall have a substantial, positive effect on revenue, with little
detectable downside in terms of taxpayer satisfaction and the accuracy of tax perceptions for the
typical property. Second, performance pay schemes with clearly defined objective criteria and with
fixed proportional incentives tend to do better than more subjective, potentially uncertain, and
multidimensional schemes. Comparing the Revenue and Revenue Plus scheme, we find that by
year two the Revenue scheme had increased revenue by about 13 log points, whereas the Revenue
Plus scheme increased current revenue by only about 9 log points; on the other hand, customer sat-
isfaction appears slightly higher in the Revenue Plus scheme. The Flexible Bonus scheme did worse
than either Revenue or Revenue Plus on all dimensions measured here. This provides suggestive
evidence against subjective, potentially uncertain, and more multidimensional assessments and in
favor of clearer, predictable, formula-based assessments that consider fewer metrics. This may be
especially so in contexts where there may be concerns about credibility and how the more complex,
subjective, and flexible assessments may be applied (see Baker et al. 1994, Prendergast and Topel
1996, Prendergast 1999, MacLeod 2003 for related theoretical work on subjective bonuses).
6.2 Changes in Tax Assessments and Rent Sharing
The model in Section 3 illustrates how taxpayers and tax collectors may collude to not pay
taxes. The model shows how performance pay can make collusion harder and lead to higher tax
collection and a switch from the collusive (high bribe, low tax) equilibrium to a non-collusive (low
bribe, high tax) one, which could explain the increase in tax revenues. But the model also suggests
that other taxpayers, who remain in the collusive equilibrium, would instead have to pay higher
bribes to compensate tax inspectors for their foregone incentive pay. This section explores these
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issues in more detail.
6.2.1 How many properties have valuation changed?
If bargaining breaks down, the theory suggests this should result in a change in the official tax
valuation recorded by the government, τ . To explore changes in τ in the data, we examine impact
on the number and composition of properties whose official tax valuation was changed. We refer to
these properties as “reassessed,” which includes both properties added to the official tax rolls for
the first time as well as previously taxed properties whose tax valuation is updated.
Table 5 shows the total number of reassessed properties, broken down by properties reported as
assessed for the first time and those who had previously been on the tax rolls but whose valuation
was updated. We obtained these data directly from the underlying tax registers. We control for
the number of new and reassessed properties added in the baseline year (i.e. FY10-11) to capture
heterogeneity across circles in their underlying rate of change of properties.23
The results show a substantial increase in the number of properties whose valuations were
changed in response to the treatment. On average (over the two year treatment period), there are
83 more properties per circle with new or updated valuations in treatment tax circles compared to
controls, about an 86% increase over the control group. Most of this increase comes from properties
that are newly reported. Column 2 shows that treatment circles add about 74 more newly valued
properties to the tax rolls than controls (202% increase over the control group), while an additional
9 properties see their valuations updated. Note, however, that most of these properties are not
actually new – 53 percent of these newly assessed properties were built before 2011 and a third
constructed prior to 2006 (i.e. more than 5 years prior to the start of our experiment). In our
field visits accompanying tax collectors, it was clear that they made visits to their tax circles
frequently and were aware of where properties were located and their status (around two thirds
of the supposedly new properties were within 500 meters of a property that reported having been
visited by the tax collector). It therefore seems more likely that the tax inspector was aware of
these properties and they were strategically added to the rolls once performance pay incentives
were introduced.
While these numbers document a substantial increase in activity in treatment circles compared
to control circles in percentage terms, it is worth noting that the absolute numbers are still rela-
tively small compared to the total number of properties in the circle: 74 new properties represents
about 3 percent of the average number of taxable properties in the circle.24 Nevertheless, as we
explain below, these changing tax valuations are sufficient to explain essentially all of the change in
23Note that since obtaining this data required a separate, detailed count of a different set of administrative records,
we have this data only for a randomly-sampled set (approximately 50 percent) of circles.
24Note that these reassessments are not necessarily exhausting a fixed supply of new or modified properties. Our
property survey indicates that 1-2% of properties are built new each year, and an additional 2% have been either
renovated or changed use in the past year, and since these properties tend to be larger and more valuable than the
average property, there is substantial scope for additional ongoing increases in revenue collection.
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revenue collected from the experiment. Increases in tax revenue can come through several margins:
increasing the tax base by adding new properties to the tax rolls or updating their valuations,
reducing exemptions granted to move tax bills closer to the gross tax base, or increasing the re-
covery rate of issued tax bills. Using the administrative data, we can decompose the increases in
tax revenue into these three components. Doing so reveals that the vast majority of the increase
in tax revenue is attributable to an increase in the tax base (see Appendix D), which is the type of
reassessment documented in this section.
6.2.2 Changes in Collusion?
The model of collusion in Section 3 suggests that the treatment effects on taxes and bribes
paid should be heterogeneous among properties. For properties that switch from collusive to non-
collusive equilibrium, we would expect to see an increase in taxes paid and a reduction in bribes.
For properties that remain in the collusive equilibrium, we have more ambiguous predictions: the
sum of bribes plus taxes paid should go up, but whether this comes from an increase in bribes,
taxes, or some combination is less theoretically clear.25 For properties that were in the non-collusive
equilibrium before, and remain there, we would expect no changes.
To investigate these effects, in Table 6, Panel A we first estimate equation (5.4) in Section 5 on
the general population of properties to capture how typical properties in treatment areas differ on tax
and bribe payments compared to equivalent properties in control areas. For the typical property,
we find that tax payments are essentially unchanged (column 1). Note, though, that since the
change in official revenues observed in the administrative data comes from a very small number of
properties (as shown above), we would not necessarily detect it by looking across all properties,
and indeed, we cannot reject the null of an average increase in taxes paid of the magnitude found
in the administrative data.
In our model of collusive corruption, a low reassessment rate is consistent with many properties
rebargaining bribes as a result of the incentive treatment. Indeed, columns 2 and 3 show that bribe
rates - measured as the typical amount a property owner would pay in unofficial payments to the
tax department over the course of the year for a similar property - increase substantially, by Rs.
594 (US $6, or about 32 percent higher compared to the average control area property).26 The
frequency of bribe payments also increases substantially. The one metric of corruption that does
not change is the overall perception of corruption in the tax department.27
25Note that in the simple linear framework in Section 3, bribes unambiguously increase for properties that remain
in the collusive equilibrium, but in the extension in Appendix A.1 with convex costs, the prediction on bribes becomes
ambiguous.
26Note that the increase in average bribe payments comes entirely from the intensive margin, as we would expect
from a shift in the collusive equilibrium. See Appendix Table 15 for more details.
27Note that we experimented in a pilot survey with asking directly whether the respondent had paid bribes. We
experienced low response rates to this question, and found that respondents were much more forthcoming when we
asked the question indirectly, i.e. what the going bribe rate was for a property that was “similar” to theirs. Note
that this phrasing does not necessarily yield a precise average bribe paid, since respondents may answer the question
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Given limited statistical power in being able to detect the increase in overall taxes paid in
treatment circles due to the low frequency of reassessed properties, we now turn to specifically
focusing our analysis on these reassessed properties. In Panel B of Table 6, we estimate equation
(5.5), which examines the differential impact between typical properties and reassessed properties
(i.e. those whose tax bill changed, who may be disproportionately those that switch from one
equilibrium to another). The coefficient β2 from equation (5.5), i.e. the coefficient on ReAssessed,
captures how properties that are reassessed (or newly entered on the tax rolls) differ from the general
population of properties in control circles, and β1, the coefficient on Reassessed ∗ Treatment,
captures any additional difference in treatment circles (the treatment dummy is absorbed by the
circle fixed effect).
There are several key results. First, compared with non-reassessed properties, properties in
control circles whose valuations were changed pay substantially higher taxes – Rs. 2,763, or about
70 percent higher than the control group mean for random properties. This is even more true in
treatment areas, where reassessed properties pay an additional Rs. 1,884 more than non-reassessed
properties. The results here are consistent with the treatment effect on revenue we see in the
administrative data.28 On the other hand, the increase seen in bribes in treatment areas is not
seen for reassessed properties, that is, the coefficient on ReAssessed ∗ Treatment is negative, and
completely offsets the treatment effect for bribes on random properties shown in Panel A.29
Thus these results show, as suggested in the model, that performance pay for tax collectors
leads to heterogeneous effects: increases in bribes for the majority of properties, but no increases in
bribes with substantial increases in tax revenue for a small number of properties that switch from
collusion to non-collusion. While bribes do not fall to zero for re-assessed properties, as would be
either conditional or unconditional on paying a bribe and the wording of the question is not precise enough to reliably
distinguish between the two. Since the frequency of bribes paid also goes up, however, this implies that even though
we may not be able to estimate the precise magnitude, average bribe payments do in general increase.
28To see this, note that average tax in a circle is a weighted average of tax paid by reassessed and non-reassessed
properties, i.e.
E[TaxPayment] = E[TaxPayment|Reassessed]P (Reassessed)+E[TaxPayment|NonReassessed]P (NonReassessed)
Based on our estimates here and data on reassessment rates (9% of taxable properties were reassessed in the
cumulative two year treatment period in control circles, and for simplicity we treat our general population sample as
composed only of non-reassessed properties), this average in control areas is
(0.09)(3928 + 2763) + (0.91)(3928) = 4177
This gives an average tax per property of Rs. 4,177 in control areas. Using our treatment effect estimates (i.e. increases
in the number of reassessed properties and the greater payments received from such properties), the analogous average
tax in treatment circles is given by
(0.128)(3928 + 2763 + 1884) + (0.872)(3928) = 4523
An increase in the average tax per property from Rs. 4,177 to Rs. 4,523 represents a 8.3% increase in tax collection,
which is quite close to the observed effect from our administrative data of about 9% (9.3 log points).
29Appendix Table 6-H repeats analysis of Table 6 broken down by the three subtreatments. The results do not
show substantial differences in these dimensions among the three subtreatments.
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predicted by the linear model if collusion were avoided entirely, the qualitative pattern from the
model emerges. This also underscores that the increased revenue as a result of the performance
pay schemes is due to a small number of properties moving from a collusive to a non-collusive
equilibrium and the corresponding substantial increase in taxes paid by such properties.
Table 7 examines whether there is an analogous differential response on non-revenue outcomes,
i.e. satisfaction, inaccuracy and the tax gap. The key results are for inaccuracy and the tax gap.
Column 3 shows that reassessed properties are more accurately (i.e. less inaccurately) assessed
compared to non-reassessed properties. That is, there is a closer match between the tax liability
computed by our independent surveyors and that computed by the tax department. Moreover,
column 4 shows that while the typical (i.e. randomly-selected) property in the control group is
under-taxed, this is eliminated in reassessed properties (i.e. adding the coefficient of 0.122 on
reassessment to the mean of -0.103 yields a net result of 0.019, which is not statistically significant
from zero (p-value of 0.191)); i.e. reassessed properties are, on average, taxed at the amount our
independent survey team would predict. While these effects are similar in both treatment and
control areas, they confirm the view of reassessment as a bargaining breakdown: unlike typical
randomly-selected properties, which in general are under-taxed, reassessed properties are assessed
more accurately and are neither over- nor under-taxed on average.
Reassessed properties are not, broadly speaking, unsatisfied with the tax department. In fact,
Table 7 shows that reassessed properties in general appear more satisfied with the tax department,
and this is not different between treatment and control. One reason that there may be no change in
satisfaction for these properties between treatment and control – even though they pay fewer bribes
but much higher taxes in treatment areas – is that the theory predicts that those who are reassessed
and switch between the collusive and non-collusive equilibrium in response to the treatment are
those who are closest to being indifferent between the two regimes. The switch from collusive to
non-collusive equilibrium may therefore represent a second-order utility change for these property
owners, even though it yields a first-order change in revenue for the government.
All told, the results here paint a picture consistent with the theoretical framework: in pay for
performance regimes, most properties pay no more taxes but do pay somewhat higher bribes; but,
some properties switch from the collusive to non-collusive equilibrium. Those properties that are
reassessed do not experience the increase in bribes, but instead pay substantially higher taxes, are
assessed more accurately, and are no longer under-assessed relative to what our independent survey
reveals.
6.2.3 Who gets reassessed?
If these reassessments represent bargaining breakdowns, an interesting question is which property-
tax inspector pairs are affected. In the model, equation (3.5) shows that the increase in taxes comes
from those properties on the margin of switching – i.e. those properties with taxpayer and tax col-
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lector values of the disutility of evasion parameters αi and βi such that they are close to indifferent
between the high bribe, low tax equilibrium and the low bribe, high tax equilibrium.
To examine who these marginal properties are in the data, we consider how reassessed properties
differ from typical properties, and how this differs in treatment versus control areas. The results,
estimated using equation (5.5), are presented in Table 8, where Panel A examines characteristics
of the property and Panel B examines characteristics of the owner. Panel A shows that reassessed
properties are generally those (in both treatment and control areas) that are subject to higher tax
rates than typical property. For example, according to the data we obtain from our independent
survey, they have a Gross Annual Rental Value (i.e. tax base, before exemptions are applied) that
is 67% higher than the mean property in control areas. They also have more floors and are more
likely to have been recently renovated, to belong to a more expensive tax bracket (tax category), to
be commercial (which is taxed at a higher rate), and to be rented (which is also taxed at a higher
rate).
Examining whether any of these margins change further in treatment circles, the point estimates
suggest that, on net, reassessed properties in treatment areas have a GARV that is an additional
33% larger (p-value of 0.21) than the average reassessed property in control areas. Therefore,
reassessed properties in treatment areas have a 122% higher GARV than the typical property in
control areas from the general population sample.30 Incentivized staff also seem to focus more on
commercial rented properties, which have the highest assessments per square foot of area. One
interpretation is that commercial properties have a higher disutility from paying bribes (i.e. higher
αi) than residential properties and hence are more marginal.
Panel B considers differences in owner characteristics. One interesting finding is that those
owners who report a close personal (family/friend) relationship with a politician are 1.3 percentage
points (over a baseline value of 5.3% in control circles) less likely to be reassessed than typical
properties. However, this effect is undone in treatment areas – so that while connected owners
seem to enjoy an advantage in general, this no longer the case in treatment areas. We should
caveat that this particular result be interpreted with caution, given that it is only one out of
many coefficients examined. However, it is interesting that a similar pattern holds for education:
educated owners are in general more likely to be reassessed, but this effect is undone in treatment
areas. On net, the results in this section do paint a consistent picture: the performance incentives
led inspectors to concentrate on a relatively small number of high-value properties.
30Another way to look at this is to plot, non-parametrically, the relationship between the probability of being
reassessed and tax density, which is the tax valuation per unit of covered area. Appendix Figure F.1 shows that high
tax density properties appear more likely to be reassessed in treatment areas.
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6.3 Alternative Channels
6.3.1 Changes in collusion vs. greater inspector search effort?
We have interpreted our results so far in the context of changes in collusive behavior as a result
of introducing performance pay. This is not meant to imply that changing effort on the part of
tax staff might not play a role as well. Instead, we posit that we are unlikely to observe the above
pattern of results without a change in collusion along the lines of our model. That is, although a
tax collector may respond to treatment by working harder at uncovering the true tax liability of a
taxpayer or in getting recovery against that liability (as in standard moral hazard models such as
Hölmstrom 1979), these forces alone are not consistent with the results we find on bribes.
Furthermore, evidence from self-reported behavior by inspectors does not seem to indicate such
effort was important: in Appendix Table 16 we find little observable change in effort (total hours
spent working per day, etc.) reported by inspectors in treatment areas. The only result is that
inspectors seem to be spending more time in the office and less in the field. While it is possible
that time in the office is correlated with higher effort (e.g. filling out paperwork), it is not a priori
what one would have expected in terms of effort, especially to the extent that the relevant margin
was uncovering recent property changes. However, changes in collusion could quite plausibly imply
more time in the office in order to change corresponding paperwork.
In addition, Appendix Table 23 presents further evidence to suggest that the tax collector likely
had prior knowledge about properties that were newly added to the tax registers. We compare
attributes of properties newly added to the register to attributes of properties that were verified
as new based on the third party property survey. We find that the former are more likely to be
rented, commercial, and larger in area (all of which imply a higher tax liability), and have been
occupied by the current tenant for longer. In fact, properties that are newly assessed are more
likely to be rented (which is harder to observe without prior interactions) even conditional on other
property characteristics. These results suggest properties newly added to the tax rolls are being
systematically targeted, something that would not be feasible unless the tax collector had prior
(private) information that is now being revealed.
6.3.2 Mechanisms Beyond Price Effects
We have thus far interpreted our results as due to the increased marginal incentives (i.e. price
effects) provided to collect more taxes. However, the schemes have other aspects that could also en-
hance performance. In this section we briefly discuss several of these alternate channels (additional
details can be found in Appendix D). The objective of this section is not to definitely rule out these
channels - it is likely they do contribute to some extent - but rather to see how significant they
may be. We conclude that while some of these channels may partly contribute, the price effects of
the incentives still seem to be the primary way in which the incentives had an impact.
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With any performance-based payment scheme that pays over baseline salary, two potential
confounds are perceived monitoring effects and income effects. Perceived monitoring refers to the
fact that the incentive scheme may affect agents’ beliefs about how they will be monitored even
outside of the explicit financial incentives. Income effects refer to the fact that a top-up incentive
scheme increases the overall income of an agent, in addition to changing the price of the incentivized
action. In this case, if honesty is a normal good (i.e. inspectors take bribes because they have a
high marginal utility of income) or there are efficiency wage effects as in Becker and Stigler (1974),
one could imagine that our effects are also due to income (and not just price) effects.
For both of these potential alternate channels, an important piece of evidence of the primary
role of price effects is the difference between the three incentive schemes. In particular, all three
schemes were equally salient to inspectors and all three performance-pay schemes were designed
to generate approximately similar expected income (and indeed did so),31 yet we saw above that
they generate very different impacts on revenue: the increase in tax revenue in Revenue was almost
double what was is in Revenue Plus, and the Flexible Bonus scheme produced no detectable tax
impacts. These simple facts suggest prima facie that the different prices implicit in the different
schemes are primarily what are driving the results, not the income transfer per se.
Several additional tests also confirm that price effects seem to be the primary explanation for
our results. Starting in Year 2, we introduced an “information-only” scheme that provided identical
information to the Revenue scheme, but without financial payments. As discussed in Appendix E.1,
this scheme produced no statistically significant effects on total or current revenue, and suggests
that perceived monitoring explained no more than one-third the total impact. To investigate income
effects, Appendix E.2 tests for any income effects using the fact that benchmarks in the Revenue
and Revenue Plus schemes we determined based on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th lags of revenue, but
not the 1st lag, so the 1st lag of revenue generates a shock to income but not price effects. This
approach also finds no strong evidence of income effects in this context.
Supervisory effort could also respond to the incentive scheme. While this is not a confound per
se, it entails a slightly different interpretation of the results. However, we show in Appendix E.3
that a separate treatment scheme that explicitly rewarded supervisors (in an analogous manner to
the Revenue scheme) had no effects on average, nor did it have substantial interactions with the
direct incentives. We also show that inspectors do not report being more extensively pressured by
their supervisors to work harder in areas with inspector incentives, so on net this does not appear
to be an important part of the story.
Given that the randomization was conducted publicly (to ensure a perception of fairness),
this meant that both control and treatment circles knew their respective identities. One potential
concern is that control group inspectors may have become discouraged and performed worse, leading
31Average payments to inspectors in Year 1 were: Rs. 255,608 in Revenue, Rs. 247,283 in Revenue Plus, and Rs.
297,370 in Flexible Bonus. Average payments in Year 2 were: Rs. 255,773 in Revenue, Rs. 282,490 in Revenue Plus,
and Rs. 255,977 in Flexible Bonus.
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us to over-estimate treatment effects. While any such spillovers are less of a concern when comparing
among the three treatment schemes, it is also worth noting that in general, the rate of growth of
revenue in control circles during the experimental years was greater than during the previous
years, suggesting that overall discouragement was not a first order concern. In addition, to test
for spillovers more directly, Appendix Table 10 examines the impact of the treatment on nearby,
neighboring control circles, where the treatment would be particularly salient, compared to control
circles further away with whom inspectors interacted less often. If spillovers were to have occurred,
they would likely have occurred locally, as inspectors in nearby circles share the same physical office
space. We cannot reject the null of no spillovers.
Finally, one may also be concerned that the performance pay scheme could have increased
inspectors’ security of tenure within their circles. However, tax staff were told explicitly that
normal transfer policy would be in effect during the study, and we show in Appendix Table 17 that
there are no statistically significant differences in transfer rates among treatment and control staff.
6.4 Cost-effectiveness
From the government’s and broader policy perspective, a natural question is whether these
schemes were cost-effective, i.e. whether the additional revenue received in taxes exceeded the
amount paid as incentives. As shown in Section 3, under the assumption that bribes represent
a transfer rather than an efficiency loss, the change in net revenue for the government – revenue
received in taxes less the amount paid in incentives – is a measure of the change in social welfare
from the program.
For the Revenue and Revenue Plus scheme, which pay out to staff a percentage of revenue
collected over a fixed benchmark, one would expect the net revenue to be positive so long as the
benchmark was set sufficiently high that one is not paying for infra-marginal collections. Of course,
benchmarks cannot be set too high or else staff would not be in the money and would not be
receiving incentives on the margin, so setting the benchmark is non-trivial. For the Flexible Bonus
Scheme, the payments were fixed in advance, so it is less clear ex-ante whether net revenue for the
government would be positive.
We focus on cost effectiveness in the second year of the program, when it was at scale. For each
circle, we predict the revenue at the end of year 2 using our estimated treatment effects for each
scheme.32 We use the estimates to calculate the predicted additional revenue in treatment circles
due to the treatment, and then sum this across treatment circles to obtain total additional revenue.
The total costs are the actual performance-based payments paid out under each of the schemes.
Net revenue is the difference between predicted additional revenue and the incentive costs.
32The only change from our main specification is that we estimate reduced form treatment effects, where we weight
each circle by the circle’s revenue in the baseline year to account for any heterogeneity in treatment effects across
circles of different sizes, which matters substantially for the impact on total revenue raised.
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The results are shown in Table 9. Since the point estimates are slightly different depending on
whether the information treatment is included as part of the control group (as in Table 3) or not
(as in Appendix Table 3-I), we report the results both ways (Panel A and B respectively). Taken
together the results show that net revenue is positive, so the schemes are cost-effective. Dividing
the net gain (revenue less costs) by costs to calculate a “return on investment” for the government
shows a return of 15% (Panel A) to 30% (Panel B). For the Revenue scheme, which raised the
most revenue, the return at the end of Year 2 ranges from 35% (Panel A) to 51% (Panel B). The
Revenue Plus scheme earns 14% to 28% ROI, and the Flexible Bonus scheme loses money for the
government.
Note that since a main channel seems to be an increase in net demand (i.e. new properties added
to the tax rolls), to the extent these changes are permanent and last even after the treatments
are discontinued, the long-run cost-effectiveness from a time-limited/temporary introduction of
performance-based pay could be substantially higher than the numbers reported here.
7 Conclusion
Our paper examines the impact of introducing performance pay schemes in taxation. Taxation
is interesting not only because it is feasible to design outcome-based pay mechanisms, but also
because it presents interesting challenges in considering incentive pay mechanisms. Given the
potential for collusion between the civil servant and the citizen, high-powered incentives are not
simply about increasing worker effort to achieve the desired (i.e. incentivized) outcome. Instead,
in such contexts incentives can increase the bargaining power of the civil servant with respect to
the taxpayer, leading to potentially less desirable outcomes.
Our results suggest that, while these effects on bargaining are present, on net performance
pay mechanisms can be quite effective in raising additional taxes, and they can do so without
generating too much animosity towards the tax department as was often associated with tax farming
historically. While it is possible that such costs may show up over a time frame longer than
two years, it is nevertheless instructive to examine why such costs might not be as high in our
performance-pay schemes. In standard contract theory, a principal has to better incentivize an
agent to the extent that the agent’s objective function differs from the principal’s. In taxation, to
the extent that there is collusion - and our results suggest that this is an important margin - there
is a clear wedge in such objectives in terms of raising taxes. Performance pay can therefore reduce
this wedge by directly making the tax collector a (partly) residual claimant on taxes collected.
But what about divergences in political objectives between the politician/government and tax
collectors? The historical tax farming literature suggests that collectors may have been less sen-
sitive to political costs they imposed when raising taxes. However, tax collectors in our context
may not be as free to raise taxes – they are not so locally powerful that they are unaffected by
the displeasure of the population they tax. In fact, more often than not they may have weaker
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socioeconomic and political influence compared to those they are meant to tax, and so may also be
quite concerned about the potential costs that raising excessive taxes may induce. Qualitatively,
conversations with tax collectors suggested that this was a concern, i.e. tax collectors would justify
lower collections by noting that the taxpayers could get them transferred or otherwise sanctioned
both because the individual taxpayer may be quite influential and/or because they may collectively
be powerful (e.g., shop-keepers’ local associations). In fact, quite often (perhaps as a tacit means
of justifying collusion), tax collectors would express sympathy to taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay
taxes, particularly in poorer localities, given the general level of dissatisfaction taxpayers would
have about how their taxes are utilized (locally) by the state.
So how might tax collectors balance their increased incentives to raise more taxes due to
performance-pay schemes with a need to not increase taxpayer dissatisfaction? One could imagine
two different types of potential responses. One response is to tax a large number of (poorer) prop-
erty owners, who may have less influence or ability to push back, and to spare the more connected,
wealthier owners of larger properties. Alternatively, inspectors could focus their efforts on a small
number of high value owners. This would generate the largest return per property, and avoid alien-
ating a large number of people, but could be risky if it alienates influential people. In a sense, this
is a tradeoff between two types of influence: since each person gets one vote, smallholders have
more votes per dollar, and hence more influence democratically, but largeholders may have more
influence. The results here suggest that inspectors took the latter approach: focusing on a small
number of high value property owners.
In terms of how collusion mediates the impact of performance pay, we find evidence that it
indeed strengthens the bargaining power of the tax collector. For the majority of taxpayers, tax
payments remain unaffected, although they end up paying higher rents to the tax collector as
they re-bargain. While some taxpayers do end up paying more taxes and collusion breaks down,
generating more revenue for the government, these results offer a word of caution that that the
effects of incentives are more complex than they would be in a world where the only margin is
effort and there is no collusion. If the goal is to both increase performance/collections and reduce
rent-seeking, one may need to accompany a performance pay mechanism with stricter monitoring
and direct penalties for rent-seeking.
Taken together, the results suggest that, notwithstanding historical concerns regarding tax farm-
ing and the relative absence of such high-powered incentives in developed economies, performance-
pay schemes in taxation may be a promising avenue to explore for developing economies seeking to
raise revenues. The remaining question for governments is whether they can mitigate the poten-
tially undesirable effects of the increased bargaining power tax staff have over taxpayers by more
direct audit based processes that can effectively detect and penalize collusion. The fact that our
results show impacts on the tax base suggest that a promising direction may be to introduce high-
powered incentives for short durations and at times when revealing information to the government
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is particularly important (such as when a major revaluation of properties or similar such reform is
underway), and such schemes may need to be accompanied by complementary efforts at reducing
corruption and better third party data verification processes. To the extent these concerns can
be addressed, our results demonstrate that such schemes can be an important and financially and
politically feasible way for emerging economies to undertake the essential and necessary task of
raising tax revenue and enlarging their tax base.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Randomization Implementation
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
Revenue 53 72 47 68
Revenue Plus 54 74 48 68
Flexible Bonus 54 73 49 67
Information 0 70 0 66
Control 322 194 338 213
Notes: The first two columns (under Randomization)
show the number of circles that were assigned to each of
the three (or four) treatment types in each year. In cases
where staff did not consent to treatment after the first bal-
lot (in Year 1), circles were assigned treatment values of
1/3 for each main treatment type (i.e. Revenue, Revenue
Plus, and Flexible Bonus). Values are rounded. The sec-
ond two columns (under Implementation) show the number
of circles that were actually implementing the treatment at
the end of the fiscal year. Treatment wasn’t implemented
either because of lack of consent or because the initially se-
lected circle staff were transferred to new posts. See text
for more details.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD N
Panel A: Administrative Data
Log Revenue (Total) 15.75 0.74 482
Log Revenue (Current) 15.52 0.73 482
Log Revenue (Arrears) 13.91 1.17 479
Log Tax Base (Total) 16.14 0.80 482
Log Tax Base (Current) 15.86 0.73 482
Log Tax Base (Arrears) 14.40 1.37 479
Log Non-Exemption Rate (Total) -0.23 0.20 482
Log Non-Exemption Rate (Current) -0.19 0.13 482
Log Non-Exemption Rate (Arrears) -0.30 0.41 479
Log Recovery Rate (Total) -0.16 0.18 482
Log Recovery Rate (Current) -0.14 0.14 482
Log Recovery Rate (Arrears) -0.19 0.29 479
Panel B: Survey Data
Property successfully found in administrative records (dummy) .84 .37 11,971
Quality of Tax Department [0-1] .53 .22 6,050
Satisfaction with Tax Department [0-1] .55 .23 6,050
Inaccuracy .34 .27 9,870
Tax Gap -.099 .42 9,870
GARV 32,302 252,426 10,787
Self-reported tax payment in FY 2013 3,562 18,604 12,000
Bribe Payment 2,073 3,932 5,993
Frequency of Bribe Payment .76 .88 4,802
Notes: Panel A statistics from administrative data are shown at the end of Year 2 of the study
(FY 2012-2013). Each observation is one of the 482 circles as defined at the time of randomization.
Panel B statistics from the property survey are for properties from the random sample drawn from
the field. The Inaccuracy and Tax Gap measures are available for only those properties that could
be matched to the administrative records. Subjective variables - i.e., Quality, Satisfaction, Bribe
Payment, and Frequency of Bribe Payment - are reported for circles from the first phase of the
survey only (see Appendix B for more details).
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Table 3: Impacts on Revenue Collected
Year 1 Year 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Current Arrears Total Current Arrears
Panel A: Main Treatment
Any treatment 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.152** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.113
(0.028) (0.027) (0.069) (0.031) (0.032) (0.083)
Panel B: Subtreatments
Revenue 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.134 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.005
(0.035) (0.034) (0.099) (0.043) (0.044) (0.133)
Revenue Plus 0.080 0.086* 0.072 0.093** 0.081* 0.175
(0.053) (0.052) (0.110) (0.045) (0.049) (0.114)
Flexible Bonus 0.071* 0.024 0.243** 0.056 0.035 0.148
(0.038) (0.035) (0.098) (0.041) (0.042) (0.108)
N 481 481 481 482 482 479
Mean of control group 15.671 15.379 14.030 15.745 15.518 13.915
Rev. vs. Multitasking p. 0.323 0.193 0.830 0.233 0.049 0.262
Objective vs. Subjective p. 0.530 0.090 0.212 0.220 0.084 0.634
Equality of Schemes 0.562 0.143 0.433 0.359 0.086 0.527
Joint significance 0.004 0.010 0.073 0.012 0.005 0.305
Notes: This table presents results on the impact of the performance pay schemes on revenue-based
outcomes. We use instrumental variables regressions, where treatment status is instrumented with
randomization results. The unit of observation is a circle, as defined at the time of randomization.
Outcome variable is log revenue collection as of the end of the fiscal year, for total revenue (Columns
1 and 4), current year revenue (Columns 2 and 5), and collections against arrears (columns 3 and
6). Specification follows Equation 5.3 of the main text, and includes stratum fixed effects. ’Any
treatment’ in Panel A includes the 3 subtreatments in Panel B. The Information treatment is included
in the control group. We report p-values from tests of equality of coefficients as follows: Rev. vs.
Multitasking tests for equality between Revenue and the average of Revenue Plus and Flexible Bonus;
Objective vs. Subjective tests for equality of the average of Revenue and Revenue Plus against Flexible
Bonus; Equality of Schemes tests whether all coefficients are equal; and Joint significance tests joint
null that all coefficients are equal to 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by a robust partition of circles, i.e. the group of circles such that all circles that merged or
split with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Impacts on Non-Revenue Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quality Satisfaction Inaccuracy Tax Gap
Panel A: Main Treatment
Any treatment -0.006 -0.011 0.004 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022)
Panel B: Subtreatments
Revenue 0.006 -0.006 0.002 -0.022
(0.036) (0.037) (0.017) (0.029)
Revenue Plus 0.040 0.029 0.028* 0.015
(0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.032)
Flexible Bonus -0.060* -0.053* -0.016 0.029
(0.031) (0.032) (0.018) (0.031)
N 6050 6050 9870 9870
Sample Phase 1 Phase 1 Full Full
Mean of control group 0.538 0.555 0.339 -0.103
Rev. vs. Multitasking p. 0.683 0.876 0.813 0.159
Objective vs. Subjective p. 0.015 0.064 0.099 0.315
Equality of Schemes 0.014 0.059 0.090 0.344
Joint significance 0.035 0.129 0.160 0.533
Notes: This table presents results on the impact of the performance pay schemes
on non-revenue outcomes. We use instrumental variables regressions, where treat-
ment status is instrumented with randomization results. Unit of observation is a
property. Specification follows Equation 5.5 of the main text, and includes stratum
fixed effects. Quality and Satisfaction were measured on a 5 point Likert scale and
re-scaled to a [0,1] interval. Tax Gap is the difference in the official gross annual
rental value (GARV) minus our estimated GARV, divided by the sum of these. Tax
Gap measures over/undertaxation, with positive coefficients indicating overtaxation.
Inaccuracy is the absolute value of Tax Gap. Sample is restricted to Phase 1 of the
survey for subjective outcomes (Quality and Satisfaction). The Information treat-
ment is included in the control group. We report p-values from tests of equality of
coefficients as follows: Rev. vs. Multitasking tests for equality between Revenue
and the average of Revenue Plus and Flexible Bonus; Objective vs. Subjective tests
for equality of the average of Revenue and Revenue Plus against Flexible Bonus;
Equality of Schemes tests whether all coefficients are equal; and Joint significance
tests joint null that all coefficients are equal to 0. Standard errors are clustered by
robust partition of circles, i.e. the group of circles such that all circles that merged
or split with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Table 5: Impacts on Number of Reassessed Properties
(1) (2) (3)
Total Number of Section 9 Properties
Added to Tax Rolls
in Treatment Period
Number of New Properties
Added to Tax Rolls
in Treatment Period
Number of Reassessed Properties
Added to Tax Rolls
in Treatment Period
Treatment 83.0* 74.0** 9.0
(45.27) (34.39) (22.35)
N 234 234 234
Mean of control group 96.7 36.7 60.0
Notes: This table presents results on the impact of performance pay schemes on the number of properties that experience a change
in tax status. Column 1 presents treatment effects on the total number of such properties added. The next two columns disaggregate
this effect by whether the property is reported to have been previously registered on the tax rolls (Column 3) or not (Column 2). The
sample consists of circles surveyed in Phase 2 (see text for details). Specification includes stratum fixed effects and controls for number
of new and reassessed properties added in the pre-treatment (FY 2011) fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered by robust partition,
the partition of circles such that all circles that merged or split with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Impacts on Tax Payments and Corruption, by Reassessed Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-reported
Tax Payment
Bribe Payment
Frequency of
Bribe Payment
Perception of
Corruption
Panel A: General Population Sample Only
Treatment -62.81 594.1* .2021** .0113
(264.7) (341.7) (.0951) (.0254)
N 11586 5993 4802 6050
Mean of control group 4069.425 1874.542 0.683 0.644
Panel B: Re-assessed and General Population Sample
Re-assessed * Treatment 1884* -557.4 -.1592* -.0031
(1083) (380.1) (.0942) (.0221)
Re-assessed 2763*** -66.38 .0137 -.0191*
(572.9) (177.5) (.0403) (.0107)
N 16353 8207 6993 8268
Sample Full Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 1
Mean of control group in gen. pop. sample 3928.252 1874.542 0.683 0.644
Notes: This table considers how the average property in treatment areas differs in terms of the tax payments and bribes it reports
(Panel A) as well as asking whether these outcomes differ for reassessed properties (Panel B). In both cases we present instrumental
variables regressions, where treatment status is instrumented with randomization results. Unit of observation is a property. Bribe
Payment is the respondent’s response to how much bribe they think others would pay for a similar property. Frequency of Bribe
Payment and Perception of Corruption are graded on a 5 point rubric and scaled to the interval [0,1]. Panel A uses only properties
from the random sample drawn from the field, while Panel B also includes properties that were selected from the official register
of reassessments. The Re-assessed dummy in Panel B denotes such (reassessed) properties. The specifications in Panel A follow
Equation 5.5 of the main text, with the exception of Column (1), which controls for self-reported baseline (FY 2011) tax payment.
Specifications in Panel B follow Equation 5.6 of the main text. For Columns (2-4), sample is restricted to circles from the first
phase of the survey (see text for details). In both Panels A and B, specifications include a control for whether the response came
from the short version of the survey, and the phase of the survey (if applicable). The Information treatment is included in the
control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by robust partition of circles, i.e. the group
of circles such that all circles that merged or split with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Table 7: Impacts on Satisfaction and Accuracy, by Reassessed Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quality Satisfaction Inaccuracy Tax Gap
Re-assessed * Treatment 0.009 0.005 0.001 -0.005
(0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.028)
Re-assessed 0.049*** 0.044*** -0.061*** 0.122***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015)
N 8268 8268 14173 14173
Sample Phase 1 Phase 1 Full Full
Mean of control group in gen. pop. sample 0.538 0.555 0.339 -0.103
Notes: This table examines whether non-revenue based outcomes differ for reassessed properties.
The unit of observation is a property. Specification follows Equation 5.6 of the main text, and controls
for whether the response came from the short version of the survey. Columns (1) and (2) restrict
the sample circles from the first phase of the survey (see Appendix B for details). The Information
treatment is included in the control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered by robust partition, i.e. the group of circles such that all circles that merged or split
with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Selection Effects on Reassessments
Panel A
Components of GARV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GARV
Number of
floors
Last
renovation
was ≤ 2
years ago
Land area
(sq. feet)
Total
covered area
(sq. feet)
Main
Road
Tax Category
Percent of
property
commercial
Percent of
property
commercial
and rented
Tax
Liability
Re-assess * Treatment 20137.796 0.002 -0.005 -32.599 852.092 -0.002 -0.226** 0.018 0.075** 3897.980
(16187.550) (0.050) (0.020) (82.473) (771.516) (0.048) (0.088) (0.037) (0.029) (3539.474)
Re-assess 24683.609*** 0.078*** 0.094*** 37.396 -156.619 0.064*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.176*** 5503.481***
(7944.915) (0.026) (0.011) (57.199) (379.299) (0.024) (0.044) (0.019) (0.015) (1754.013)
N 15090 16352 16354 16352 16352 16352 15090 16226 16227 15090
Mean of
control group
in gen. pop. sample
36808.77 1.57 0.02 301.13 2779.82 0.46 3.78 0.35 0.17 6642.00
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Approximate
age of owner
Owner’s level
of education
Per-capita
wages
Predicted
expenditure
given assets
Connected
to Politician
Connected
to Politician/
Government/
Police
Re-assess * Treatment -0.348 -0.523* -821.749 110.798 0.021* 0.005
(0.799) (0.317) (1078.191) (213.234) (0.012) (0.027)
Re-assess -0.656* 0.303* 13.126 -94.529 -0.013** 0.005
(0.398) (0.157) (510.006) (122.380) (0.006) (0.014)
N 13406 16254 13765 13954 16354 16354
Mean of
control group
in gen. pop. sample
50.70 9.19 16281.55 6292.58 0.05 0.36
Notes: Property level 2SLS regressions. Specifications follow Equation 5.6 of the main text, and includes a control for whether the response came from the short version of
the questionnaire. Panel A looks at selection effects on property characteristics and Panel B looks at selection effects on owner/tenant characteristics. The characteristics
in Panel A labeled Components of GARV are those that directly enter into the formula used to calculate GARV. Tax Category (Panel A, Column 7) is 7-tiered categorical
variable with 7 being the most expensive tax bracket and 1 being the cheapest. Per-capita wages (Panel B, Column 3) is self-reported household expenditures divided by
the total number of working household members. Predicted expenditure given assests (Panel B, Column 4) is the predicted value of a regression of household expenditure
on series of dummy variables indicating various household assets. Standard errors in all panels are clustered by robust partition, the partition of circles such that all circles
that merged or split with each other are included within the same partition. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Cost-effectiveness of Incentives
(1)
Additional Revenue
(2)
Cost of Incentives
(3)
ROI
Panel A: Information in controls
Any treatment 124,961,461 108,387,160 15.29
Revenue 50,578,024 37,349,784 35.42
Revenue Plus 40,671,290 35,549,342 14.41
Flexible Bonus 30,555,313 35,488,035 -13.90
Panel B: Information out of controls
Any treatment 140,973,016 108,387,160 30.06
Revenue 56,269,064 37,349,784 50.65
Revenue Plus 45,539,845 35,549,342 28.10
Flexible Bonus 35,571,720 35,488,035 0.24
Notes: This table estimates the economic return generated by the performance pay schemes.
Column 1 estimates the additional revenue due to treatment, calculated with a reduced form
regression of log total revenue on log total baseline revenue, weighting observations by baseline
revenue (in levels). For each treated observation, we generate a prediction of revenue collection
under treatment and a prediction of revenue collection in absence of treatment and subtract to
calculate the additional revenue due to treatment. The total additional revenue collection due
to treatment is the sum of additional revenue collection across treated observations. Panels A
and B show how the calculation changes depending on whether the Information treatment is
included in the controls (Panel A) or dummied out (Panel B). Column 2 gives the actual costs of
the incentive payments paid to circle staff under each scheme. Column 3 then presents Return
on Investment (ROI), which is simply the percent increase in additional revenue above costs.
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